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To commence the statutory time
for appeals ns of right (Cl'LR 55 l3 (a)),
you arc advised to serve a copy of this
order, with notice or en try, upon all parties.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF ORANGE
-----------~---------------------------------~-~------------)(

In the Matter of the Application of
ROBERTO PASCAL,
Petitioner,

DECISION AND ORDER
INDEX NO.: 2032/2014

-againstNE'W YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,

Respondent.
----~--~-----~------------------ -----~---------------------)(

SCIORTINO, J.

The following papers numbered I to 26 were considered in connection with the application
by petitioner for an Order and Judgment pursuant to CPLR A1ticlc 78:

PAPERS

NUMBERED

Petition/Exhibits A-M 1
Answer and Return/Exhibits 1-11

I - 14
15 - 26

Petitioner Roberto Pascal (Petitioner) seeks an Order and Judgment pursuant to CPLR Article
78, for the following relief: (A) release on parole; or, alternatively, (B) a new parole hearing.
Background and Procedural History

Petitioner is serving an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life, upon his conviction for
two murders which took place during grocery store hold-ups in Brooklyn in 1979, when petitioner
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Note that many of the Exhibits propounded by petitioner have multiple exhibits attached

to them.

was 19 years old. In the first incident, which occurred on May 24, 1979, petitioner was convicted
by a jury as an accomplice acting in concert with co-defendants. In the second incident, on May 30,
1979, petitioner pied guilty, also as an accomplice acting in concert. Petitioner was also convicted
of second-degree attempted murder and first degree robbery and pied guilty to separate charges of
first-degree robbery and other charges.
Petitioner is a citizen of Panama and is subject to a final Order of Deportation (#A35-l 97863) issued by the United States on July 20, 1994. He will be returned to Panama upon his release
from prison.
Ile was first eligible for parole in 2004 and has appeared before the Parole Board four times,
in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010, prior to the appearance which is the subject of this Petition. After
each appearance, parole was denied, and petitioner was ordered held for an additional 24 months.
On May 22, 2012, petitioner appeared before the Parole Board for a fifth time. P1ior to his
hearing, on or about May 11, 2012, petitioner was evaluated by the COMPAS Reentry Assessment
system, receiving a Risk Level 4 rating, the lowest risk rating for re-arrest or absconding.
(Responding Papers, Exhibit 3)
At his hearing on May 22, 2012, petitioner was questioned extensively about the
circumstances of his convictions, including the plea offers made to him and his reasons for having
become involved in criminal activity. (Responding Papers, Exhibit 4) He was specifically asked
whether he fired shots or shot anyoac and denied both. He was also asked about his prior criminal
history, including a drug-related misdemeanor and a car theft.
Petitioner listed some ofhis course work and programs which had been completed, including
network and parenting and healthy marriage classes. He acknowledged receiving one Tier II
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di°sciplinary ticket, since his last appearance.
The Board questioned petitioner about the Deportation Order, and he expressed that he
wished to return to Panama, where he had a cousin and sister.

If he_ were not deported, he

anticipated living with his wife in Brooklyn; if he were deported, he expected that she would come
to Panama to be with him. He understood that if he were deported, he could not return to the US,
where his daughter lives. (Exhibit 4 at p. 6) If he were released, petitioner planned to work with
the Fortune Society, Osbourne Association and Exodus for assistance. (Exhibit 4 at page 7)
Petitioner acknowledged responsibility and expressed remorse for the crimes he committed.
(Exhibit 4 at pp. 3, 7)
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board denied parole, and held petitioner for an
additional 24 months, to May 2014. 2 The Decision stated:
After a careful review ofyour record, a personal interview,
and deliberation, parole is denied.
Your institutional
accomplishments and release plans are noted. Required statutory
factors have been considered, including your risk to the community,
rehabilitation efforts and your needs for successful reintegration into
the community. This panel remains concerned, however, about the
serious and violent nature of the instant offense, which when
considered with the required relevant factors, leads to the conclusion
that ifreleased at this time, there's a reasonable probability that you
would you [sic] not live and remain at liberty without violating the
law and your release at this time is incompatible with the welfare and
safety of the community.
On May 29, 2012, petitioner filed an administrative notice of appeal and filed his briet:
perfecting the appeal on May 29, 2012. (Responding Papers, Exhibit 7)

The Brief asserted that

the Parole Board relied on erroneous information and that the two-year hold was excessive,
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W11ether petitioner has appeared at a subsequent parole hearing, and what disposition
such hearing may have had is unknown to this Court.
3

unnecessary and irrational.

The erroneous information including references to the COMP AS

Assessment, including findings which deemed him to have "notable disciplinary issues;" that he had
a history of drug and alcohol abuse; and that it was "unsure" whether he had friends and family who
visited him in prison. (Exhibit 7 at page 4)

Petitioner argued that the Board's decision was based

on now-defunct sentencing guidelines, instead of measuring the likelihood of petitioner's success
upon release. He further argued that the Parole Board misapprehended his conviction history and
his current sentences and ignored the Final Deportation Order as well as his rehabilitation. (Exhibit
7 at pp. 5-6)
On June 18, 2013, the administrative appeal was denied. (Responding Papers, Exhibit 8)
Petitioner initially commenced this proceeding in Kings County in June 2013.

After an Order to

Show Cause to change venue, filed by respondent, venue was transferred to Orange County, by Order
dated February 7, 2014.
Petition and Answer

The Petition alleges that the Parole Board's May 22, 2012 decision violates express and
implied legislative policy. (Petition at 138) Specifically, petitioner asserts that the Board failed to
comply with the 2011 parole law amendments, requiring the implementation of new written
procedures for parole release decisions.

He reiterates the argument, made in the administrative

appeal, that the denial of parole was based on the now-defunct sentencing guidelines repealed by the

1011 amendments. He further argues, for the first time, that the Board's consideration of his
Youthful Offender adjudications as well as arrests that did not lead to convictions, constituted a
violation of State Human Rights Law §296( 16) and claimed that these factors also led to negative
conclusions in the COMPAS evaluation. He asserts that the Board failed to take lhe deportation

4

order into consideration. (Petition at ~45) and that the denial's failure to contain a detailed and nonconclusory explanation ofits determination violates Executive Law §259-i(2)(a)(I). (Petition at~46)
Finally, he argues that the denial of his parole was "pre-determined" and an arbitrary, capricious and
irrational abuse of discretion. (Petition at ,48)
In its Answer, respondent argues that the Court may not consider issues raised in the Petition
which were not part of the administrative appeal, specifically, the failure to consider petitioner's
remorse; the failure to place the Board's deliberations on the record; the consideration of Youthful
Offender adjudications and arrests not leading to convictions; and the failure to sufficiently consider
the COMPAS evaluation. (Answer at

~2)

However, to the extent that they may be considered,

respondent asserts that the arguments are without merit. Remorse is not a factor in discretionary
parole determinations. Nor is there any requirement that internal deliberations appear on the record.
further, the Board is not only entitled, but mandated, to consider the entirety of an inmate's record,
including arrests that did not result in prosecution and youthful offender adjudications. Moreover,
the Board is entitled to place whatever weight it deems appropriate on any factor, including the
scored COMPAS evaluation.
With respect to the balance of petitioner's arguments, respondent asserts that the Board is
entitled to exercise its independent judgment in weighing any statutory factor in making its
determination. In so doing, the Board may rely on official documents, including the Pre-Sentence
Investigation Report, and the inmate is not entitled to collaterally. aftack it. Finally, the Board's
determination complied with the written procedures requirement of Executive Law §259-c(4).
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Discussion
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies:
The Court is not empowered to consider any issue not raised on the administrative appeal.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that judicial review be limited to
consideration of only those issues actually raised before the administrative agency which made the
determination. Roggemann v. Bane, 223 AD2d 854 (3rd Dep't 1996)
Respondent correctly observes that petitioner's administrative appeal did not include the
issues of his remorse, or his argument that the Board's deliberations were not on the record. Nor did
he raise the issues concerning the Board's consideration of his prior, non-prosecuted arrests or his
Youthfol Offender adjudication. While respondent asserts that petitioner's arguments arc without
merit regardless ofthe exhaustion issue, this Court is not required to make such a finding and herein
dismisses those portions of the petition as beyond the Court's jurisdiction. Matter ofMoore v. NYS
Board of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 (3'd Dep't 1996)

However, respondent's assertion that petitioner failed to raise COMPAS issue is misplaced.
Petitioner's Brief on Administrative Appeal does, in fact, address the COMPAS finding that he was
at low risk of re-arrest, a factor he alleges was ignored by the Parole Board. Consequently, this
argument may be considered by the Court upon review.
Standards for Review:
It has becomcfundamcntal that release on parole is a discretionary frmction of the Parole
Board. Provided that the detem1ination of the Board follows statutory standards for such decisions,
it will not be disturbed by a Court, absent a showing that the decision is "irrational bordering on
impropriety" and, thus, arbitrary and capricious. Matter cifSilmon v. Travis, 95 NY 2d 470 (2000);
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Matter ofKing v. NYS Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423 (1st Dep't 1993), a.ff'd, 83 NY 2d 788 (1994);
Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 AD3d 10.5 (l sr Dep't 2008)
Executive Law §259-i(c)(A) provides that discretionary release on parole shall not be granted
merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined, but rather
after considering ifthere is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to undermine respect for the law.

Matter ofKing, supra, 190 AD2d at 430
'TI1e Parole Board is required to consider a number of factors in determining whether an
inmate should be released. Executive Law §259-i requires the court to consider factors including,
but not limited to, the institutional record (including program goals and accomplishments, vocational
education, academic achievements, etc); release plans, including community resources, employment,
education and training and available support services; any deportation order issued; the seriousness
of the offense, with due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the attorney and the pre-sentence probation report, and the
prior criminal record. Matter of Malone v. Evans, 83 AD3d 719 (211d Dep't 2011); Siao-Pao v.
Dennison, supra, Sl AD2d atl06
The Parole Board's decision need not specifically refer to each and every factor nor must it
give each factor equal weight. "(fatter of King, supra, 190 AD2d at 431 The weight to~)· accorded
to each statutory factor lies

so·l~ly within

the discretion of the Board. Siczo-Pao v. DennJson, supra,

51 AD3d at 108 However, it is incumbent on the Board to actually consider each applicable
statutory factor and, "where the record convincingly demonstrates that the board did in fact fail to
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consider the proper standards, the courts must intervene." Matter of King, supra, 190 AD2d at 431
Executive Law §259-c[4] requires the Board to incorporate risk and needs principles to
measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the Board and the likelihood of success of
such persons upon release. Boards must adopt procedures to assist members in determining which
inmates may be released to parole supervision. Matter ofThwaites v. NYS Board ofParole, 34 Misc.
3d 694 (2011)
Where the Board's determination includes consideration of all relevant statutory factors,
including the criminal history, the instant offense, the [lack of] disciplinary infractions since the last
appearance, program and educational accomplishments and post-release plans, further judicial review
is precluded. Matter ofBorcsok v. NYS Division of Parole, 34 AD3d 961 (3'd Dep't 2006)
Conversely, however, when the Board denies parole, it is required to inform the inmate in
writing of the factors and reasons for the denial, and "[s]uch reasons shall be given in detail and not
in conclusory terms". Executive Law §259-i[2][a]; Matter ofMitchell v. NYS Division ofParole, 58
AD3d 742 (2"d Dep't 2009)

A detailed written explanation is necessary to enable intelligent

judicial review of the Board's decision. Matter of West v. NYS Board of Parole, 41 Misc. 3d
12 l 4(A) (2013) The absence of such a detailed decision inappropriate forecloses the possibility of
intelligent review. Mayfield v. Evans, 93 A03d 98, 100 (1 51 Dcp't 2010)

The decision to deny

parole cannot be based solely on the nature of the instant offense. Winchell v. Evans, 27 Misc. 3-d
1232(A) (2010), citing Wallman v. Travi.~:,..18 AD 3d 304, 307-08 (1 51 Dep't2005)

'

A Parole Board's denial of parole, which focused almost exclusively on the inmate's crim~,
while failing to take into account and fairly consider any of the other relevant statutory facto rs which
categorically supported inmate's release, was arbitrary and capricious. Similarly, the Board's failure
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,

to explain, other than the facts of the crime; why the inmate's release was incompatible with public
safety and welfare, could not be supported.

Matter of Morris v. NYS Dep 't of CorrecNons and

Community Supervision, 40 Misc. 3d 226(2013)

In the instant matter, the Court finds that the Board's decision focused almost exclusively on
petitioner's crime and his poor criminal record. Although the serious nature of the crime remains
"acutely relevant" in determining whether petitioner should be released, the Board must still take into
acc0tmt and fairly consider the other relevant statutory factors. Matter of West. supra, 4 1 Misc. 3d
at 1214(A) An examination of the transcript reveals that the Board's clear focus was on the subject
conviction and his prior criminal record. id.
Such intent is corroborated by the "boilerplate" decision, which. contains the statutory
language and the "terse, conclusory sentences" that "(y]our institutional accomplishments and release
plal1S are noted. Required statutory factors have been considered". Id.
Even more convincingly, in Matter o.fThwaites, supra, the Board's decision stated:
After a careful review of your r ecor d, a p ersonal
inter view, .and deliber ation, par ole is denied. Your institutional
accomplishments and r elease plans ar e noted, as is your improved
disciplinary record. T his p an el r emains concerned, h owever, about your
history of unlawful conduct, the gracity (sic) of your instant offense and the
disregard displayed for the norms ofour society, wh en cons ider ed with th e
r equir ed r elevan t fact ors lea ds to th e conclusion that your discretionary
release is inappropriate at this time and incompatible with the welfar e of
tbe community and would so deprecate the seriousness of your crime as to
undermine respect for the law. (Emphasis added)

Upon review, the Court found that this lan·guage, nearly identical to the finding at bar
relied almost exclusively on the nature of petitioner's crime. 34 Misc. 3d at 700 While the
petitioner's accomplishments and release plans were noted, the decision focused on the
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..
circumstances of the crime committed more than 25 years earlier. Id.
Reasoning that employs past-centered rhetoric.and not future-focused risk assessment
analysis is inconsistent with the rational determination of the inquiry at hand, to wit: whether
the inmate can live and remain at liberty without violating the law and whether his release was
incompatible with the welfare of society and did not deprecate the seriousness of his crime so
as to undermine respect for the law. Id., citing Executive Law §259-i[2][c]
The Court in Matter of Thwaites found the Board's decision to be arbitrary and
capricious, irrational and improper based on the Board's failure to articulate any rational, nonconclusory basis, other than its reliance on the seriousness of the crime, why the Board could
not believe there was a reasonable probability that the petitioner could live and remain at liberty
without violating the law, and that his release was incompatible with the welfare of society and
did not deprecate the seriousness of his crime so as to undermine respect for the law. Id at 70 l
Similarly, in Matter of Morris, supru, the Court found that a "passing mention" of
petitioner's accomplislunents and document submissions, and conclusory statements that
statutory factors were considered, were "woefully inadequate" to demonstrate that the Board
weighed or fairly considered the required statutory factors. 40 Misc. 3d at 234; Matter ofWest,

supra, I 2 I 4(A)
In this matter, the Board's decision appears to have accorded no weight and no emphasis
whatso~ver

to any factor apart from the seriousness of petitio.ner's offense. See, Winchell v.

Evans, supra. 27 Misc. 3d l 232(A} For respondents to have simply restated the usual and
predictable language contained in so many parole release decisions, with no specificity or other
explanation to justify parole denial, is unacceptable.
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Bn1etsch v. NYS Department of

• f

Corrections and Community Supervision, 43 Misc. 3d 1223(A) (5/1112014)

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court concludes that petitioner has adequately
established his contention that the Parole Board's determination was arbitrary and capricious,
irrational and improper. Having so determined, the Court need not reach the other arguments
asserted by petitioner.
The May 22, 2012 decision of the Board of Parole is hereby vacated, and to the extent
not already mooted by any action of a subsequent Board, this matter is remanded to the Board
ofParole. Within 30 days of the date of the service of a copy of this Order, with notice of entry,
petitioner shall be entitled to a new parole hearing consistent with this decision and the
mandates of Executive Law §§259-c and 259-i.

The new hearing shall be held before a

different panel of the Parole Board.
This decision shall constitute the order of the Court.
Dated: June 4, 2014
Goshen, New York

To:

Roberto Pascal, 80-B-1082
Otisville Correctional Facility
57 Sanitarium Road
Otisville, NY I 0963

~r lvt~

HON. SANDRA B. SCIORTINO, J.S.C.

Jeane L. Strickland Smith
Office of the New York State Attorney General
One Civi'~ · Center Plaza, Suite 401
Poughkeepsie, NY 1260 l
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